ABSTRACT
The
shock waves emanating from the September 11 tragedy have had dramatic
consequences in Australia's immigration laws. Legislative and policy
changes have occurred in the administration of Australia's immigration
system which have broader implications for many of the fundamental
principles on which the Australian democratic political system is
founded. Largely affecting new Australians, many of these changes,
which mirror those occurring in other Western democracies, have involved
a dismantling of traditionally accepted Conventions which underpin our
way of life, and have been made largely without publicity or serious
political debate.
The
paper argues that long-term ramifications of these developments should
be a cause of real concern. It is time for a stock-take to be made and
for those clamouring for ever more control being vested in the Executive
to be called to justify more publicly their actions.
THE
BACKGROUND
There
are certain events in history which are so monumental that we all recall
what we were doing at the relevant time. Given our close allegiance
with Great Britain and the USA, events occurring in these countries are
often as remembered as significant Australian events. I can
recall the disruption caused to my last law exam on November 11, 1975 by
events occurring in Canberra that day - Australia's first political coup
- and perhaps the lighting of the flame at the Sydney Olympics by Cathy
Freeman in September 2000, as well as her great victory in the 400
metres that followed, will also go down in the watershed of Australian
history as events of iconoclastic significance - who knows? Certainly
it may be as important for national reconciliation with our indigenous
people as the result of the 1967 Referendum - where we could feel united
in celebration and pride for the nation symbolically lead by an elite
aboriginal female athlete. I am
sure that we all recall what we were doing on that fateful August 1997
day in Paris when Princess Diana died in a car accident - an event which
could well mark the start of the demise of the British monarchy.
I
still remember vividly what I was doing that hot (in Sydney) November
day in 1963 when President Kennedy was assassinated (lying on Harbord
beach); and also when other year 12 students and I were clustered around
a TV set especially brought in to screen the historic first time man set
foot on the moon in 1968. And
then there was 11.00 pm Tuesday (Sydney time) 11 September 2001! I was
driving home from the monthly meeting of the NSW Jewish Board of
Deputies, and tuning in to the late ABC news the newsreader announced
the crashing of the first plane into the Twin Towers. It seemed an
accident then, however surreal the TV images were, but as we watched
later that night glued to our TV screens until the wee hours of the
morning, the full extent of the horrific events occurring in the USA
unfolded. At that time we sensed history was being made. Now,
in retrospect, with the passing of over 2 years we see that our initial
views were clearly well-founded. THE
PRINCIPLES STATED
National security has become an obsession for Western democratic
governments (perhaps cynically, a commentator might conclude, clearly
aware of the electoral benefits of the issue for a serving
administration).
History is cyclic, of course, and human memory quickly forgets the past:
the McCarthy anti-communist witch hunts would be known today to very
few, except the keenest of political aficionados and historians, or the
families of those affected - and earlier episodes of national paranoia
are only the topics of historical theses or plays or movies. It would
seem that in every generation another outbreak occurs of security-driven
hysteria against the threat to our lifestyle caused by some adversarial
extremist group or another. Each episode in turn is used to justify the
imposition of restrictive ordinances vesting greater power in the
Executive. The rights of the individual are diminished as opposed to
the needs of the community at large - the greater good of the community
- which are the common and unifying justifications.
Nevertheless, in our political system, safeguards have been developed
over the centuries to provide protection from the tyranny of an
all-powerful Executive. These include fundamentally the doctrine of the
separation of powers between the 3 levels of government: the Executive,
the Legislature and a truly independent Judiciary; universal suffrage; a
free press; the subordination of the military to civil control, the
right of due process (or natural justice) to all; trial by jury;
equality before the law; and a criminal justice system which prevents
arbitrary detention and retrospectivity of laws. Many
mechanisms have been developed over the years to afford and enforce
these protections. National constitutions enshrining rights,
international Conventions protecting the rights of people, and peoples,
developed under a United Nations System, and regulating what is
acceptable conduct in warfare, recent very important developments in
international protective human rights like the International Criminal
Court established by the Treaty of Rome, and multilateral human rights
treaties at regional level, enforced by Human Rights Courts, are all
significant in this respect. Of
course, in Australia we lack a Bill of Rights, and a system subordinate
to internationally enforced human rights law. Cataclysmic human
confrontations like the First and Second World Wars of the 20th
century ironically resulted in the advancement of protections of human
rights against tyrannical dictatorships. Bear in mind the ease with
which tyranny in the name of public security and the common good can
develop into a means by which the equally important rights of the
minority can be oppressed. Remember that neither Hitler nor Stalin were
voted in to power by a majority of the electors in a democratic vote. One
doesn't have to go beyond the views expressed by that great US statesman
Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural address:
… All too
will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the
majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be
reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal
laws must protect, and to violate which would be oppression. …
…
About to
enter, fellow-citizens, upon the exercise of duties which comprehend
everything dear and valuable to you, it is proper you should understand
what I deem the essential principles of our government, and
consequently, whose which ought to shape its administration. I will
compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear, stating the
general principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice
to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political;
peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling
alliances with none; the support of State governments in all their
rights, as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns,
and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies; the
preservation of the general government in its whole constitutional
vigor, as the sheet-anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a
jealous care of the right of election by the people, a mild and safe
corrective of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where
peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the
decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics, from which
there is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate
parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in
peace, and for the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them;
the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the
public expense, that labor may be lightly burdened; the honest payment
of our debts, and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement
of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid; the diffusion of
information, and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public
reason; freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of
person, under the protection of the habeas corpus, and trial by
juries impartially selected. These principles form the bright
constellation, which has gone before us, and guided our steps through an
age of revolution and reformation. The wisdom of our sages, and blood
of our heroes, have been devoted to their attainment; they should be the
creed of our political faith, the text of civic instruction, the
touchstone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we
wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us hasten to
retrace our steps, and to regain the road which alone leads to peace,
liberty, and safety.
In at
least 2 significant areas the policies of the current Bush
administration in the USA in my view fail to meet these standards.
The
indefinite detention of people in Guantanamo Bay is inexcusable. If the
detainees have committed a crime let them be charged and prosecuted and
let them defend their innocence, if that is their choice. The failure
to do so brings the administration to the same level of injustice as
that practised by the regime overthrown in Afghanistan in the name of
liberty and other democratic values. The longer the present situation
continues, the greater the travesty of justice and the more the present
situation becomes intolerable. The
doctrine of pre-emptive strike, whilst superficially appealing, creates
a precedent whereby the rule by force, and not the rule of law, between
nations, and by corollary by states against its citizenry, is
justified. There is a patent contradiction between accountability and
transparency of the political process, on the one hand, and a system in
which the end is used to justify the means. I do not accept the
propriety of Australia being the Deputy Sheriff or enforcer for such an
abusive world view. At the
last 3 International Bar Association conferences I have attended - in
Durban, South Africa in September 2002, in San Francisco in September
2003 and in London in November 2003 - significant sessions were devoted
to presentations on the impact of September 11 on immigration laws of
various countries. At all of these sessions, a common thread emerged.
Western Governments, in the name of national security, were introducing
a variety of restrictive laws, the combined effect of which was to
whittle away to varying levels of insignificance cherished human rights
which had evolved over the centuries, and many of which had remained
notwithstanding equally serious if not greater threats to national
security. One of
my greatest concerns is the open-ended and ill-defined nature of the
"War against Terrorism," in the name of which so many of the newly
introduced measures have been made. But this is the topic of another
paper.
Migrants, outsiders, have always been a convenient whipping board for
those anxious to protect the perceived purity of the nation. The
generous terms expressed in the poem of Emma Lazarus which adorn the
Statue of Liberty:
"Give me your tired, your poor,
your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,"
are
hardly matched by the political rhetoric of today, where governments
loudly and erroneously proclaim that governments alone have the right to
determine who shall enter a country and control the border. Those
uttering these statements fail to mention that international human
rights Conventions that the civilised international community has
developed, such as the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Convention
Against Torture of 1984, to name the most important, contain
non-refoulement clauses which form a very significant exception to the
unilateral power of governments. The practice of demonising the
victims, and defenceless, with terminology and means that Goebbels would
have envied, has been developed into an art, to the moral shame of the
perpetrators of this injustice, as well as their gullible and
inexcusably ill-informed supporters.
Refugees are of course by definition victims of gross human rights
violations, usually of governments. Cross border flight is a
concomitant feature of the refugee's plight. Restrictive legislation
which impairs or prevents a refugee accessing the protection of another
State clearly runs counter to the spirit, if not the letter, of
obligations voluntarily accepted by States party to the Convention.
AUSTRALIAN RESPONSES
It is
with these opening observations in mind that we should consider the
legislative and policy changes which have taken place in Australia since
September 11, many of which in fact pre-empted those taken by other
countries, and others of which mirror developments in traditional allies
like the UK and the USA.
Australians have now been the direct target of
terrorist attacks in Indonesia. To date, there have been no such
onslaughts within our borders and the focus of the Australian government
therefore seems to be to take pro-active steps to implement hard-line
preventative measures. Because of its relative geographic isolation,
Australia has historically escaped enemy attacks within its borders to a
greater extent than most other countries. International terrorism,
however, is not bound to the restrictions of conventional warfare and
does not leave any country inviolate. The Australian government, in an
attempt to protect the country's borders, seems intent on obtaining
sweeping executive powers to take concise and unchallengeable action in
dealing with immigration law matters, on the basis that this is needed
in the interest of national security.
True, Australia had initiated stricter border
protection measures even before the terrorist attacks in America. The
Border Protection Legislation Act 1999 was introduced to give
immigration officers greater powers in dealing with illegal
non-citizens.
In this legislation, the Executive was authorized to pursue and board
foreign ships, to search such ships, to move and destroy hazardous
ships, and to seize and/ or dispose of things used in the commission of
an immigration offence.
Australia has a long spanning immigration history and
its community comprises of a rich mixture of cultural and ethic
backgrounds. Australia has also been a longstanding responsible member
state, being the sixth country to accept responsibilities towards
refugees, of the United Nation Convention on Refugees. We have
operated on a per capita basis the world's largest refugee resettlement
programme, jointly with the UNHCR.
Despite the fact that many Australians come from
migrant or refugee families, or are migrants themselves,
there is inexplicably a very strong public sentiment - fanned by
political pronouncements - against the entry of the so called
'boatpeople', the great majority of whom ironically end up being granted
protection in Australia under its UN refugee obligations.
Unfortunately, a significant portion of the
Australian community's view on asylum seekers is that of suspicion and
intolerance. In opinion polls
that were taken on 2 September 2001 (at the height of the Tampa crisis)
regarding boats carrying asylum seekers: 50% of participants felt that
all boats should be turned back and 38% was of the opinion that only
some boats should be allowed to enter Australia depending on the
circumstances - a mere 9% thought that all boats carrying asylum seekers
should be permitted to enter for assessment as refugees. Not
surprisingly, public sentiment grew less tolerant after 11 September and
the following statistics were recorded from a poll taken in October
2001: 56% for no asylum seeking boats, 33% depending on the
circumstances and 8% accepting the boat arrivals.
Confusing the issues?
There is of course a danger in confusing issues of
national security with the plight of asylum seekers/ refugees and other
immigrants in the aftermath of September 11. Public opinion is easily
swayed by media attention to selective material and anti-refugee views
are exacerbated by the ever-increasing influx of illegal immigrants and
people smuggling worldwide. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
expressed a number of concerns related to the issues raised above in a
press release dated 24 October 2001. He records increasing public
perception of refugees and asylum seekers as criminals and abhors other
attempts to create unwarranted links between refugees and terrorism and
to demonise the victims. The press release mentions racism and
xenophobia, problems of entry and access to refugee status
determination, the exclusion of genuine asylum seekers, the worsening
treatment of asylum seekers, increased withdrawal of refugee status from
refugees, increased deportation, and an over emphasis on resettlement to
third countries. It was further stated that care must be taken in the
implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,
which calls for the cooperation of countries against terrorism, not to
unfairly prejudice bona fide asylum seekers. By taking too strict a view on these matters and
giving excessive powers to the Executive over border protection and
immigration regulation, the essential principles of liberty, democracy
and rule of law will be jeopardized. Policy changesThe Australian government moved quickly after
September 11 to introduce vast and far-reaching security and immigration
legislation justified on the ground of better protecting Australia's
borders. Examples of new immigration regulations and screening
actions that have been introduced as a direct or indirect response to
September 11 are: Firstly, the introduction of 'privative clauses' into
Australian immigration law. Privative clauses in essence disallow an appeal of
the executive's (administrative) decision-making powers to the courts.
Under current legislation certain visa applicants are entitled to have
adverse decisions by DIMIA to be reviewed by either the Migration Review
Tribunal (MRT), the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) or, under specific
circumstances, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). These
tribunals have a quasi-judicial nature, are constituted by members who
do not necessarily have legal training and who are appointed by the
government for short terms (usually 3 years, subject to extension). On
2 October 2001 the Australian Parliament, in a bid to effectively
prevent visa applicants from seeking judicial review, introduced
sections 486A
and 474
of the Migration Act. A grave
concern that arises from such restrictions is the unchallengeable use of
executive power. It is accepted by all democratic and free countries
that the separation of powers is fundamental to fair and accountable
government. Australia's Constitution specifically protects the
Judiciary's powers, while restricting the Executive's powers. A
challenge was mounted in the High Court of Australia against this law. On 4 February 2003, a unanimous decision was handed
by the High Court of Australia
that found: where a jurisdictional error exists in an administrative
decision, no actual decision has been made, and accordingly the
privative clause would not be applicable to preclude judicial review.
The end result of this decision is that applicants once again have the
right to access the court system to have legal errors scrutinised by the
courts. This is a positive development in that the rule of law has been
protected, ensuring that Commonwealth officers do not exceed their
executive power. Secondly, there is a greater focus on visa
applicants' character in the immigration process. The traditional method of removing undesirable
non-citizens from Australia was by way of deportation, affected by the
Minister for Immigration under sections 200-201 of the Migration Act.
Under these sections a deportee must have been convicted of a criminal
offence and served sentence of at least one year. In recent times the
government has however made increasing use of its power under section
501
of the Migration Act to refuse or cancel a visa on much less stringent
character grounds. Under section 501 (6), a person does not pass the
character test if the person has a substantial criminal record, or (in
the discretion of the minister and/ or his delegate) is not a person of
good character having regard to inter alia the person's past and
present criminal conduct, or the person's past and present general
conduct (for example providing inaccurate information to DIMIA or
breaching visa conditions). The breadth of the section is huge. In instances where the Minister makes the decision
personally the principles of natural justice have been statutorily
excluded and do not apply. The Minister also has the power to override
a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (which has the
jurisdiction to review departmental decisions relating to character
under section 501) and any decision affording leniency to applicants.
Further, there is now a far greater scrutiny of all
applications by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO). Thirdly, reference needs to be made to the excision
of Australian islands from its 'migration zone'.
The publicly expressed reason behind these measures is to prevent
persons on unauthorized boat arrivals in Australian territories from
making valid visa applications or seeking protection as refugees on
Australian soil. The advantage to such an applicant is that he/she is
then entitled to lawfully remain in Australia until the matter
(including any appeal) has been finalized, which could take months or
even years. The vast majority of illegal immigrants arriving in
Australia commence their journey from Indonesian shores. Indonesia is
geographically close to Australia and has to date been unable to
effectively control the influx and exodus of asylum seekers from a
variety of countries. It is however not a signatory of the Refugee
Convention. By excluding these islands from the Australian migration
zone, intending visa applicants are barred from lodging valid onshore
visa applications, as they are technically not in Australia for that
purpose. The precedent of such a policy raises serious
implications for the effectiveness of the protection regime mandated
under the Refugee Convention. A
fourth example is the Migration Legislation Amendment (Identification
and Authentication) Bill 2004.
This Bill seeks to amend the Migration Act to insert provisions to
provide for a legislative framework for the collection of personal
identifiers from non-citizens. The Bill will enable specified personal
identifiers to be collected from visa applicants and persons entering
Australia, as well as non-citizens within Australia whilst checking
compliance with visa conditions. Non-citizens detained in terms of the
Migration Act and placed in immigration detention can also be subjected
to these measures. The following types of personal identifiers are
proposed:
1.
Fingerprints and handprints.
2. Photographs
or other images of the face and shoulders.
3. Weight and
height measurements.
4. Audio and
video recordings.
5. Signatures.
6. Iris scans;
and
7. Any other
personal identifiers as prescribed in the Regulations.
While
the Bill provides some protection to non-citizens subjected to these
measures (for example, a personal identifier that involves the use of an
intimate forensic procedure - such as blood tests or hair samples - will
be prohibited from being prescribed), there are obvious concerns raised
in relation to the enforcement of such procedures. Although it is
recognised that identity fraud is a huge problem for many Western
countries, it does raise concerns such as:
1. What are
the safeguards that would apply to the procedures?
2. Can a
personal identifier be taken without consent?
3. What are
the consequences of failure to comply with identification requirements?
4. Can
identifiers be taken from children or people with mental illness?
There are many privacy issues of concern about this
Bill, such as: What measures are taken in relation to the destruction of
the personal identifiers, the treatment of minors, data base projection
etc.
Further, there is the fundamental concern that the
regime implemented will be a far too intrusive power to the Executive to
control people.
Fifthly, an important legislative change directly linked to
anti-terrorism is the introduction of Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003. The Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Legislation Act was introduced
to enhance the capacity of Australian security organisations to combat
terrorism. It grants ASIO powers to collect intelligence that may
substantially assist in the investigation of terrorism offences. The
Act provides ASIO with the ability to seek a warrant to detain and
question people for the purposes of investigating terrorism offences.
The Act provides for the development of a written statement of
procedures or protocol to be followed in the exercise of authority to
take persons into custody, to detain persons and conduct questioning
under warrants issued under the Act. The Act also provides that no
action can be taken under the warrant until the protocol has been
followed. The protocol has been developed (in accordance with
the requirements of the Act) by the Director General of Security in
consultation with the Australian Federal Police, the Inspector General
of Intelligence and Security and the Attorney General's Department. The
protocol sets out the basic standards that will apply in the questioning
and detention of persons under a warrant. It clarifies concepts used in
the Act and addresses issues such as:
1.
Transportation of a person under warrant.
2.
Treatment of a person being questioned, for example, the conditions
applicable during questioning such as access to drinking water and
toilet and other facilities at all times during questioning.
3.
Supervision of detention under warrant and the conduct of any searches
undertaken pursuant to a warrant.
4. Health
and welfare of a person subject to a warrant, such as accommodation
facilities and food and sleep requirements.
5. The
video recording of procedures.
6. Contact
with other persons and a complaint mechanism; and finally
7.
Arrangement for liaison with other persons such as the Inspector General
of Intelligence and Security and the Commissioner of the relevant police
service. In summary, ASIO now has the power to detain and
question people believed to have information about terrorist attacks.
In a media statement by the Australian Government, it was said: "The
Australian community demands that our counter-terrorism laws are strong
and effective. The Howard Government has repeatedly and consistently
demonstrated the seriousness with which we take our responsibility to
protect Australians and Australian interests from terrorism."
Obtaining and issuing warrants under the ASIO Act
In obtaining a
warrant, the Director General of ASIO must obtain the consent of the
Attorney General before seeking a warrant from an issuing authority.
Before consenting, the Attorney General must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that issuing the warrant will
substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in
relation to a terrorism offence and that relying on other methods of
collecting that intelligence would be ineffective. If the warrant being
sought requires a person to be taken into custody immediately and
detained, the Attorney General must also be satisfied that the person
may alert another person involved in a terrorism offence of the
investigation, or the person may fail to appear before the prescribed
authority, or the person may alter or destroy a record or thing that he
may be requested to produce. If the warrant concerns a person between
the ages of 16 and 18, the Attorney General must also be satisfied on
reasonable grounds that the person will commit, is committing or has
committed a terrorism offence. An issuing authority will be either a
Federal magistrate, a Federal judge or another authority set out in the
regulations. An issuing authority may only issue a warrant if it has
been requested in accordance with the proper procedure and it is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
warrant will substantially assist in the collection of intelligence that
is important to a terrorist offence. Under the warrant if a person is taken into custody
immediately and detained, this will be the responsibility of the police,
normally the Australian Federal Police. A warrant can allow up to a
total of 24 hours of questioning in 8-hour blocks over a maximum period
of 7 days, subject to the protocol governing the questioning process.
The person will have access to a lawyer of choice, with safeguards to
protect security sensitive information and increased penalties for
security offences. A security provision places a ban on the legal
adviser communicating any unauthorised information while the subject is
detained under warrant. The penalty for breaching this provision is up
to 5 years imprisonment. Former Immigration Minister Ruddock, now the
Commonwealth Attorney-General, has foreshadowed an expansion of these
powers, justified on national security grounds. As a
corollary to the above, in NSW, specific anti-terrorism powers have been
given to the police in controversial legislation passed in 2003.
Extended powers to hold and detain persons on general suspicion have
been enacted. The
Australian Government has also foreshadowed new legislation and
administrative measures to protect sensitive information disclosed
during court cases involving classified or security sensitive material.
The range of new measures that has been designed to overcome the
procedural and evidentiary problems associated with prosecuting criminal
offences involving sensitive material include:
1.
Enabling closed hearings on the use, the relevance or admissibility of
such material before it becomes an issue in open court.
2.
Enabling the court to allow summaries or stipulations as to the facts to
be substituted.
3.
Requiring all persons to obey, under threat of criminal penalty, any
court order or direction relating to handling and disclosure of
information.
4.
Requiring legal representatives who require access to the information to
be security cleared at an appropriate level. The Government has advised that these measures have
been drawn from legislative regimes in other countries such as the
United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. Finally, in this ever changing area, comment needs to
be made of the Government's homeland security style audit of precautions
against terrorist attacks and illegal entry into Australia revealed on
page 1 of The Australian on 18 February 2004. To quote the
article:
"The
sweeping nationwide review, which will cost hundreds of millions of
dollars when recommendations are implemented, will check the security of
the coastline; immigration procedures; airport security, particularly at
isolated regional airports; airlines; travel advice for tourists;
intelligence alerts; harbour security and transport.
It will
be the first national stocktake of Australia's security precautions
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The plan
is to check Australia's preparedness to deal with terrorist events and
gauge the effectiveness of steps taken so far. The report is likely to
be completed and released before the federal election, expected in
October or November.
Co-ordinating and measuring preparedness against domestic terror attacks
in the US is one of the tasks of the Department of Homeland Security,
but the Coalition has refused to establish such a department because it
believes it adds another layer of bureaucracy.
The
departments of Immigration, Customs, and Transport and Regional Services
will be the main areas examined and there is expected to be a further
drain on the budget surplus to fund the stocktake.
Australia's northern coastline and the Coastwatch program - meant to
detect illegal boat arrivals - will also be reviewed."
Note again the direct linking of Immigration with
national security; a logical link one might believe, but a convenient
one given the context the subject of this paper. Finally, and in my view, one of the most serious
developments has been the decision to use the military to perform
essentially civilian operations to repel would-be asylum seekers. It is
noteworthy that this occurred soon after legislative amendments
permitted the military to perform security during the 2000 Sydney
Olympic Games, and also that there was almost no expression of community
concern at the broader implications of this decision. Established
Conventions call for the deployment of the military in domestic crises
with the utmost caution, and not as is becoming apparent, whenever a
perceived problem, with a political genesis, occurs. A military used to
involvement in domestic affairs creates a recipe for future serious
problems.
Concluding commentsAt the
2003 London Conference two immigration officers from the newly created
monolithic USA Department of Homeland Security presented papers. They
spoke of a new immigration regime driven by, in their words: "fear,
ignorance and hysteria" - dare I say paranoia! A zero tolerance policy
has been introduced - officers who make one error in visa issue in terms
of security are dismissed summarily. Needless to say a collective
malaise has developed, with the visa issuing system there largely
grinding to a halt, notwithstanding all the hi tech systems in place to
provide case officers assistance in identifying potential security risk,
from bona fide visitors. Smart security has been replaced by a fortress
USA approach. Biometric identifiers, such as proposed for Australia,
will further enhance the security screen developed to protect the
country. A range of other oppressive measures have also reportedly been
introduced. In the
UK, detention without trial, differential treatment of visa applicants
based on country of origin, and interdiction policies which in large
part mirror those developed in Australia have caused serious angst to
human rights advocates. And yet
amidst these developments let me recount my own personal experience of
the effect of September 11 on UK immigration laws. I was
lucky enough by birth to hold dual citizenship: Australia and UK. I
therefore have two passports - Australian (which I use to leave and
enter Australia), and UK, which I use on entry into and departure from
that country. In 2000
when I passed through border control at Heathrow Airport I waved,
unopened, my UK passport in front of the bored immigration officer who
ushered me through without the slightest check! In November 2003 as I
approached the control booth I saw those in front had opened their
passports at the photo page. Expecting a more detailed analysis of
mine, I did likewise. As I approached the booth, open passport extended
in my right hand, the officer again waved me through without bothering
to conduct even the most cursory check. On both occasions when I left I
was not required to show my passport. On
neither occasion was any record kept of my entry into or departure from
the country. If this
is the level of commitment to border security in the UK in practice, I
query the real reason for the introduction in the UK of the draconian
laws in the name of national security there. Of
course, the USA, UK and Australia immigration practices are clearly
different. But the consequence of the loss of our cherished rights is
equally alarming in all countries. In my
mind the statement attributed to Edmund Burke ought never be forgotten:
"Evil is perpetrated when good men remain silent." And
finally to conclude with the words of John Philpot Curran given in his
speech on the Night of Election of Lord Mayor of Dublin on 10 July 1790:
"The condition upon
which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance, which
condition if he break, servitude is at once the consequence of his
crime, and the punishment of his guilt."
BIO-DATA - DAVID BITEL
David Bitel is a partner of the
long-established Sydney law firm Parish Patience Immigration,
specialising in immigration law and administrative law. He is a
registered migration agent and an accredited immigration law specialist
by the NSW Law Society. Since 1989 he has been a
Judicial Member of the Equal Opportunity Tribunal of NSW, now the NSW
Administrative Decisions Tribunal, Equal Opportunity Division. He has been Secretary-General of
the Australian Section of the International Commission of Jurists since
1983. He has particular interest in
the problems of refugees and has been President of the Refugee Council
of Australia since 1995 and chairman of the Australian Refugee
Foundation since 1998. He was founding chairman of the Refugee Advice
and Casework Service. David received Austcare's Paul Cullen
Humanitarian Award in 2002. He helped to found - and
subsequently was Chairman of - the Immigration Advice and Rights Centre
(IARC), the Gay and Lesbian Immigration Task Force (GLITF), and the
Australian Forum of Human Rights Organisations (AFHRO). David has authored many
publications, presented papers at legal conferences and has made many
submissions to Parliamentary enquiries on issues relating to human
rights, the rule of law and immigration and refugees. He is a
consultant author of Butterworth's Australian Immigration Law Service. He is and has been a member of
various committees of the Law Society of NSW, the Law Council of
Australia and the International Bar Association, the world body of
lawyers. In 2000 he was appointed Vice Chair of Committee 14 (Migration
and Nationality) of the Section on Legal Practice of the International
Bar Association, and since 2002 he has served as Senior Vice Chair of
that Committee. David is also a member of the executive of the I.B.A.
Section
486A Time limit on applications to the High Court for judicial
review
1)
An
application to the High Court for a writ of mandamus,
prohibition or certiorari or an injunction or a declaration in
respect of a privative clause decision must be made to the High
Court within 35 days of the actual (as opposed to deemed)
notification of the decision.
2)
The High Court must
not make an order allowing, or which has the effect of allowing,
an applicant to make an application mentioned in subsection (1)
outside that 35 day period.
3)
The regulations may
prescribe the way of notifying a person of a decision for the
purposes of this section.
Section 474
- Decisions under Act are final
1) A private
clause decision:
a)
Is final and
conclusive; and
b)
Must not be
challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in
question in any court; and
c)
Is not subject to
prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in
any court on any account.
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